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Abstract: One of the puzzles of human and constitutional rights law is whether there are any 
rights which are absolute. The question is important not only for practical purposes but also 
for the theory of human and constitutional rights: an absolute right presents a departure from 
what is now the ‘default’ in constitutional and human rights law around the world, namely the 
proportionality approach according to which an interference with a right is justified if it serves 
a legitimate goal and is proportionate to that goal. This paper tries to shed some light on the 
issue by focussing on the right to life. It proceeds by first presenting an account of the leading 
case in this area, namely the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the 
Aviation Security Act case, where the Court held that shooting down an airplane which was 
likely to be used as a terrorist weapon was a violation of the right to life in conjunction with 
the human dignity of the innocent passengers aboard. It then offers a few thoughts on the 
Court’s reasoning, specifically with regard to what it has to say about the idea of absolute 
rights. Having concluded that the judgment offers little help in illuminating this problem, it 
presents some approaches to absolute rights from moral philosophy and applies them to 
human and constitutional rights law. The conclusion is that the right to life will under certain 
circumstances be absolute or near-absolute, but that these circumstances occur less frequently 
than is sometimes assumed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the puzzles of human and constitutional rights law is whether there are any 
rights which are absolute, ie rights which must never be interfered with. Some of 
the candidates which come to mind are the right not to be tortured1 and the right 
to life. The question of absolute rights touches upon issues which have become 
practically highly relevant especially since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001 and the subsequent changes in the attitudes of some states towards torture 
and killings, and this alone would merit a close analysis. But furthermore, the issue 
is important for the theory of human and constitutional rights. Few ideas have 
spread as quickly and pervaded an entire area of law as thoroughly as the 
proportionality approach in constitutional rights law around the world. Robert 
Alexy’s model of rights as principles which have to be balanced against conflicting 
principles is one of the most influential theoretical accounts of this development.2 
While I am critical of some aspects of Alexy’s model,3 I do accept and subscribe to 
the desirability of balancing in constitutional rights law. But this does of course 
not imply that all constitutional rights are open to balancing in all situations; 
rather, it may turn out that some are and some are not, or some are in most but 
not all situations. But then we need a theory which distinguishes absolute from 
non-absolute rights.  
This paper will try to shed some light on this question by focussing on the 
right to life. It will proceed by first presenting an account of the leading case in 
this area, namely the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) 
in the Aviation Security Act case, where the Court held that shooting down an 
airplane which was likely to be used as a terrorist weapon was a violation of the 
right to life in conjunction with the human dignity of the innocent passengers 
aboard. I will then offer a few thoughts on the Court’s reasoning, specifically with 
regard to what it has to say about the idea of absolute rights. Having concluded 
that the judgment offers little help in illuminating this problem, I will present 
some approaches to absolute rights from moral philosophy and apply them to 
human and constitutional rights law. My conclusion will be that the right to life 
will under certain circumstances be absolute or near-absolute, but that these 
circumstances will be rarer than sometimes thought.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 cf Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  
2 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Julian Rivers, trans, Oxford: OUP, 2002). 
3 See my ‘Balancing and the Structure of Constitutional Rights’ (2007) 5 International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 453.  
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I. 
 
One of the German laws passed as a response to the attacks of 11 September 2001 
is the Aviation Security Act (Luftsicherheitsgesetz). Its most controversial part was 
§14(3) which gave the Minister of Defence permission to order the shooting down 
of passenger planes if according to the circumstances it had to be assumed that the 
aircraft was to be used against the lives of people and if the shooting down was 
the only effective defence against the threat. This part of the statute was declared 
void by the FCC in 2005.4 To understand the decision, some doctrinal background 
regarding German constitutional jurisprudence is helpful. First, according to the 
wording of the Basic Law, the right to life is not guaranteed absolutely, but can be 
interfered with pursuant to a law.5 Taken literally, this would mean that as long as 
there is a law authorising it, the state could kill unrestrictedly. This is where the 
doctrine of proportionality comes in. It means that each interference with 
constitutional rights must not only be prescribed by law, but must also be 
proportional, that is, it must serve a legitimate goal; it must be suitable to further 
this goal; it must be necessary in that there is no other, less restrictive means to 
reach the goal; and it must be proportionate stricto sensu in that its costs must not 
clearly exceed its benefits. Applying the proportionality test to the case of a 
hijacked airplane seems to indicate that the shooting down could easily be justified 
at least in those cases where the number of people likely to die in the terrorist 
attack for which the plane is being used exceeds the number of passengers on 
board.6 But it is exactly this conclusion that the petitioners opposed. Relying on a 
well-established principle of German criminal law according to which lives must 
never be balanced, they argued that the proportionality principle has no 
application in the case of the intentional killing of innocents. 
Article 1(1) of the Basic Law accords a special place to human dignity.7 The 
official English translation8 does not quite capture a subtle difference of language 
made in the original text: In German legal terminology, there is a distinction 
between ‘inviolable’ (unverletzlich) and ‘untouchable’ (unantastbar), the former 
meaning that the state may sometimes interfere with the object of the right, 
provided that it comes up with a legitimate justification, and the latter meaning 
that any interference will automatically amount to a violation of the right. Human 
                                                     
4 For an analysis of the case, cf K. Möller, ‘On Treating Persons as Ends: The German Aviation Security 
Act, Human Dignity, and the Federal Constitutional Court’ (2006) 51 Public Law 457. 
5 Article 2(2) of the Basic Law: ‘Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity [...] These 
rights may be interfered with only pursuant to a law.’ 
6 There is an additional problem, namely whether those aboard the plane should count, which may be 
disputed in light of the fact that they are going to die in the attack anyway.  
7 There is an ongoing discussion in German academia whether Article 1(1) stipulates a right to human 
dignity or merely dignity as a (nevertheless binding and justiciable) constitutional value. The debate is of 
no practical relevance, however, as there is a consensus to the effect that wherever human dignity is 
violated, there will necessarily also be a violation of one of the explicit rights in the subsequent articles of 
the Basic Law.  
8 Basic Law, n 5 above, Article 1(1): ‘Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be 
the duty of all state authority.’ 
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dignity, as the ‘superior value’ of the Basic law, is ‘untouchable’, and an 
interference can therefore never be justified. Note the radical consequences of this 
approach: in principle, even when one could save the lives of thousands by one 
violation of human dignity, it must not be carried out. Furthermore, even when 
one could prevent the violation of the dignity of thousands by violating one 
person’s dignity, this would not be permissible.9 Therefore, it does not come as a 
surprise that in light of this doctrinal approach to human dignity it seems 
necessary to interpret dignity quite narrowly. No general theory of what is and is 
not part of human dignity has yet been successfully put forward. The most 
widespread definition, employed by the FCC in many decisions, is the one first 
proposed by Günter Dürig in the 1950s who, employing the Kantian distinction 
between treating persons as ends and as means to an end, argued that dignity 
required treating persons as subjects rather than objects.10 The notorious difficulty 
in defining human dignity has not, however, prevented the concept from 
becoming both one of the cornerstones of German constitutional jurisprudence 
and a major export, in particular to the new South African11 and Eastern 
European12 constitutions. The German FCC regards human dignity as the basis of 
all constitutional rights and the central value of the Basic Law, and has referred to 
dignity as a principle guiding the interpretation of other provisions of the basic law 
in many contexts, for example in its abortion decisions13 and its privacy 
jurisprudence14.   
The Court based its decision in the Aviation Security Act case on two 
grounds. First, it argued that the law was unconstitutional because the Federation 
lacked the legislative competence for it.15 The second and more spectacular 
ground concerns the violation of constitutional rights. The Court held that §14(3) 
of the Aviation Security Act violated both human dignity and the right to life in so 
far as it permitted the shooting down of aircrafts in situations where there were 
innocent persons on board.  
The Court begins its assessment with some general remarks on the right to 
life and human dignity. It stresses that the right to life is guaranteed only pursuant 
to law, but moves on immediately to argue that any law which interferes with it 
must be interpreted in light of both the right to life and human dignity: 'Human 
                                                     
9 This is the traditional doctrine which is still endorsed by the majority of commentators but has been 
challenged in the Jakob von Metzler case and the ticking bomb case to which I will briefly refer below. cf 
W. Brugger, ‘May Government Ever Use Torture? Two Responses from German Law’ (2000) 48 
American Journal of Comparative Law 661. 
10 G. Dürig, ‘Der Grundrechtssatz von der Menschenwürde’ (1956) 81 Archiv des Öffentlichen Rechts 117, 
127. 
11 s 10. 
12 cf C. Dupré, Importing the Law in Post-Communist Transitions: The Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Right 
to Human Dignity (Oxford: Hart, 2003) ch 3. 
13 BVerfGE 39, 1, 88, 203. 
14 cf W. Schmitt Glaeser, ‘Schutz der Privatsphäre’ in J. Isensee and P. Kirchhof (eds) Handbuch des 
Staatsrechts, vol. 6 (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1989) 41, 46-47. 
15 BVerfG, 1 BvR 357/05 of 15/02/2006 at [89]-[117]. 
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life is the vital basis of human dignity as the primary structural principle and 
superior constitutional value.’16 This assumed close connection between the right 
to life and human dignity is the bridge which enables the Court to leave the right 
to life behind and concentrate, in what follows, on dignity. It does not give a 
general definition of human dignity but stresses the necessity to decide on a case-
by-case basis. However, it then relies on the old doctrine of treating persons as 
subjects rather than objects. Citing its own jurisprudence, the Court declares:  
 
Starting from the ideas of the founders of the Basic Law that it is a part of 
human nature to determine oneself in freedom and to freely develop oneself, 
and that the individual can demand as a matter of principle to be recognised 
in the community as an equal member with his own value, the duty to respect 
and protect human dignity generally excludes the possibility of making human 
beings the mere object of the state. Thus, any treatment of persons by public 
authorities which categorically questions their quality as subjects, their status 
as subjects of the law […] is plainly prohibited.17 
 
Having set out the doctrine in general, it now takes the Court a mere two 
paragraphs to apply the facts of the case to the formula:  
 
The passengers and crew members who are exposed to such a mission are in 
a desperate situation. They can no longer influence the circumstances of their 
lives independently from others in a self-determined manner. This makes 
them objects not only of the perpetrators of the crime. Also the state which 
in such a situation resorts to the measure provided by §14(3) of the Aviation 
Security Act treats them as mere objects of its rescue operation for the 
protection of others [...] Crew and passengers cannot sidestep these actions of 
the state [...] but are defencelessly and helplessly at the mercy of the state with 
the consequence that they will be shot down together with the aircraft and 
therefore be killed with near certainty. Such a treatment ignores the status of 
the persons affected as subjects endowed with dignity and inalienable rights. 
By their killing being used as a means to save others, they are treated as 
objects and at the same time deprived of their rights; with their lives being 
disposed of unilaterally by the state, the persons on board the aircraft, who, as 
victims, are themselves in need of protection, are denied the value which is 
due to a human being for his or her own sake.’18 
 
In the following section, the Court relies on an additional reason. It argues that it 
will be practically impossible to judge whether the statutory conditions for the 
shooting down have been met. In light of the fact that Germany is a relatively 
small country and that accordingly the time window in which to make the decision 
                                                     
16 ibid at [119].  
17 ibid at [121]. 
18 ibid at [123]-[124]. 
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will be very small, there was, for the Court, an immense pressure to decide quickly 
and therefore a very real danger of rash decisions.19  
The Court then sets out to consider and refute some objections to its 
conclusions. It rejects as unrealistic the proposition that passengers who enter an 
aircraft knowing that they will be shot down should it be hijacked thereby 
implicitly consent to being shot down.20 The argument that those who are 
onboard an aircraft are going to die anyway if the aircraft is used as a terrorist 
weapon is dismissed on the ground that human life and dignity must enjoy the 
same degree of protection with no regard of the probable remaining lifespan.21 
The assumption that someone who is in an aircraft which is used as a weapon is 
himself part of that weapon and has to accept being treated accordingly ‘shows 
blatantly that the victims of such an incident are no longer regarded as humans, 
but as a part of a thing, and are therefore made objects’.22 The idea that an 
individual was under a duty to sacrifice himself where this is the only option to 
prevent attacks on the community which aim at its destruction is regarded by the 
Court as too far removed from the point of the Aviation Security Act which was 
not concerned with attacks on the state as such.23 Finally, the argument that there 
was a positive duty towards those who would be the victims should the terrorist 
attack be carried out is refuted with the counterargument that although such a 
duty exists, the means used to comply with the duty must be constitutional and 
not violate human dignity.24 Each of these objections raises serious points and 
could have been the basis of long discussions; however, the Court does not engage 
with them any more than absolutely necessary and in most cases restricts itself to 
one counterargument.  
In the final section of the judgment, the Court sets out why in those cases 
where only the hijackers are on board the aircraft, the shooting down would be 
justified in constitutional terms. In such cases, the Court does not regard the 
shooting down as a violation of dignity because the criminals are not being treated 
as objects: ‘On the contrary, it corresponds to the position of the aggressor as a 
subject to make him accountable for the consequences of his autonomous 
actions.’25 Therefore, as dignity is not involved, proportionality analysis becomes 
applicable. In a lengthy analysis, the Court concludes that in those cases where 
there is reason to assume that the aircraft will be used to kill people, the shooting 
down would be proportionate. For the Court, this follows from the fact that, 
although the shooting down would be a ‘serious’ interference with the basic rights 
of the hijackers (because it would almost certainly lead to their deaths), the 
                                                     
19 ibid at [125]-[129]. 
20 ibid at [131]. 
21 ibid at [132]. 
22 ibid at [134]. 
23 ibid at [135]-[136]. 
24 ibid at [137]-[139]. 
25 ibid at [141]. 
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interference would be justified given that the hijackers themselves caused the 
necessity of the state interference and that it would lie in their hands to give up 
their criminal plan and thus prevent being shot down.26  
 
 
 
II. 
 
Courts often find themselves in a difficult position when dealing with national 
security issues: if they make a mistake and overprotect human rights at the cost of 
national security, the price in terms of human lives to pay for this mistake might 
be very high. The fact that they are not experts on issues of national security, taken 
together with their composition as bodies of unelected judges, explains the 
tendency of being very careful in intervening in national security questions. But 
this is only one side of the story: in a constitutional democracy, it is the proper 
role of the courts to enforce constitutional rights, and they cannot simply abdicate 
that responsibility on the ground that they feel incompetent to do so, that they are 
not elected, or that the majority might disagree with their conclusions. This is 
particularly true when an important right such as the right to life is at stake. For 
reasons whose analysis and defence is beyond this paper, the German FCC does 
not normally hold institutional deference in high regard, nor does it normally 
regard the fact that it is made up of unelected judges as a problem. Broadly 
speaking, it sees its role as enforcing the basic rights of the Basic Law, interpreted 
in a way which focuses on the substance of these rights, as opposed to 
considerations of institutional competence or democratic accountability. This 
explains, negatively, why the Court will not shy away from interfering with the will 
and expertise of the elected branches. But positively, it does not yet answer the 
question of what, if anything, justifies holding the right to life of the innocent 
passengers aboard the plane to be absolute, as a matter of the substance of human 
rights.  
Nothing in the wording of Article 2(2) BL indicates that the right to life could 
be absolute. The constitutional ‘default’ in this case is therefore the proportionality 
doctrine. In order to knock out the proportionality principle and come to the 
conclusion of an absolute right, the Court needs a special doctrinal tool, and it 
finds this tool in the principle of human dignity: since human dignity is absolutely 
protected, whenever a killing amounts to a violation of human dignity, it must be 
constitutionally illegitimate. The problem here is that the content of the dignity 
clause is notoriously unclear. The Court itself relies on the old Kantian formula of 
treating people not as means but as ends to justify its conclusion that human 
dignity is violated. This formula is not only the most common approach to human 
dignity, but it has also been criticised for its lack of substance and guidance and 
the corresponding danger of delivering exactly the answer that happens to suit the 
                                                     
26 ibid at [144]-[153]. 
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interpreter’s personal moral or political views best.27 The Court itself had noticed 
its vagueness and declared in an earlier judgment that ‘it is not rare for persons to 
be mere objects not only of the circumstances and social developments but also of 
the law in that they must comply without regard to their interests’.28 From a 
doctrinal perspective, it is disappointing that the Court did not even attempt to 
provide some clarity in this area.  
 
 
 
III. 
 
I will come back to what I regard as the main mistake in the judgment further 
below. In this and the following sections, I would like to take a step back from the 
Aviation Security Act case and address the general question of whether there is 
sometimes an absolute right not to be killed, meaning that the proportionality test 
which is normally applied to determine the limits of rights must be modified or 
abandoned for these cases.  
The proportionality principle is at least loosely connected to 
consequentialism29 (some would go further and claim that it represents 
consequentialist thinking). Take the example of whether it is permissible to kill 
one innocent person to prevent five innocent persons from being killed. Under a 
straightforward consequentialist approach, what counts are outcomes, and it 
seems that we should prefer the outcome of one dead person over the outcome of 
five dead. Therefore, killing the one would be permissible.  
This conclusion seems to be problematic. The point is not so much that it 
would necessarily be wrong to kill the one person; rather it seems that coming to 
this result simply by comparing numbers (‘five dead is worse than one dead’) 
misses some important moral considerations. Intuitively, it seems that killing an 
innocent person is morally wrong, even if this killing leads to an outcome that is 
overall preferable. Killing innocent persons may be morally impermissible as an 
action independently of the outcomes produced. Robert Nozick’s theory of rights 
illustrates such a deontological approach. He provides the following example: 
 
A mob rampaging through a part of town killing and burning will violate the 
rights of those living there. Therefore, someone might try to justify his 
punishing another he knows to be innocent of a crime that enraged a mob, 
on the grounds that punishing this innocent person would help to avoid even 
                                                     
27 cf N. Hoerster, ‘Zur Bedeutung des Prinzips der Menschenwürde’ (1983) Juristische Schulung 93, 95. 
28 BVerfGE 30, 1, 25-26. 
29 Consequentialism holds that the moral rightness or wrongness of an action depends exclusively on its 
consequences. 
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greater violations of rights by others, and so would lead to a minimum 
weighted score for rights violations in the society.30 
 
Nozick presents two possible routes to the solution of this problem. The first he 
calls ‘utilitarianism of rights’. While classical utilitarianism is interested in 
maximising happiness, this new version would have the goal of maximising rights 
protection: the non-violation of rights is simply built into the desirable end state to 
be achieved. Under this version punishing the innocent man would be justified 
because, although punishing him violates his rights, the number and weight of 
rights that would otherwise be violated by the mob is even greater. 
Nozick prefers the second view according to which rights function as ‘side 
constraints upon action’. Under this view, rights determine which actions are 
permissible independently of the outcomes produced. So according to this 
approach, violating one right is impermissible even if this would lead to preventing 
a larger number of rights violations. Thus, under this approach, punishing the one 
innocent person would be impermissible.  How does Nozick justify his view?  
 
Side constraints upon action reflect the underlying Kantian principle that 
individuals are ends and not merely means; they may not be sacrificed or used 
for the achieving of other ends without their consent. Individuals are 
inviolable.31 
 
But why may not one person violate persons for the greater social good? 
Individually, we each sometimes choose to undergo some pain or sacrifice for 
a greater benefit or to avoid a greater harm: we go to the dentist to avoid 
worse suffering later; we do some unpleasant work for its results; some 
persons diet to improve their health or looks; some save money to support 
themselves when they are older. In each case, some cost is borne for the sake 
of the greater overall good. Why not, similarly, hold that some persons have 
to bear some costs that benefit other persons more, for the sake of the overall 
social good? But there is no social entity with a good that undergoes some 
sacrifice for its own good. There are only individual people, different 
individual people, with their own individual lives. Using one of these people 
for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the others. Nothing more. 
What happens is that something is done to him for the sake of others. Talk of 
an overall social good covers this up. (Intentionally?) To use a person in this 
way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a 
separate person, that this is the only life he has. He does not get some 
overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and no one is entitled to force this 
upon him – least of all a state or government that claims his allegiance (as 
                                                     
30 R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974) 28-29. 
31 ibid, 30-31. 
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other individuals do not) and that therefore scrupulously must be neutral 
between its citizens.32 
 
This understanding of rights as side constraints may have intuitive appeal; 
however, the reason Nozick gives is deficient.33 Assume that his argument that 
violating a constraint treats a person as a means and not as an end was correct. So 
the point is that treating people in a certain way disrespects them. But then, why 
not conclude that we should minimise instances of disrespect? By disrespecting 
the one innocent person in Nozick’s example, we can prevent many instances of 
disrespect to the people whose rights would otherwise be violated by the mob. 
Similarly, in the example of whether it is permissible to kill one to prevent five 
from being killed, we can prevent five instances of disrespect by committing one 
such instance. Nozick may be right in everything he says about the need to treat 
people as ends, but he does not show a link between this and his claim that 
treating people as means is always morally wrong independently of the 
consequences.  
Nozick’s failure is instructive about the traps on the way to a coherent 
justification of an absolute right not to be killed. The problem is that if one 
focuses on the interests of the potential victim, one can set his interests against the 
interests of those who would be saved if the one were killed. Focussing on the 
prevention of suffering, pain, the respect owed to him as a human being, his 
chances to live his life, and so on, does not help because the same points can be 
used on the other side of the equation. If there is a sound way to defend an 
absolute right not to be killed, it must avoid this fallacy.  
 
 
 
IV. 
 
It may be helpful to separate the approaches to justify an absolute prohibition on 
killing into two categories. First, the justification may lie in something relating to 
the person who commits the killing, for example his integrity, responsibility, or 
intention (let me call these agent-focussed approaches). Second, one can turn to the 
victim and ask whether there is something pertaining to the victim which gives the 
victim the right not to be killed even if by killing him one could save more from 
being killed (I shall refer to these as victim-focussed approaches). In this section, I will 
examine two agent-focussed approaches.  
One possible agent-focussed consideration relies on the distinction between 
actions and omissions: arguably, it is impermissible to actively kill the one person, 
                                                     
32 ibid, 32-33. 
33 cf A. Walen, ‘Doing, Allowing, and Disabling: Some Principles Governing Deontological Restrictions’ 
(1995) 80 Philosophical Studies 183, 185-186. 
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but it is permissible to let the five die. While this argument may have some 
intuitive plausibility, it is however partly question-begging. If I come to a lake and 
see my son who has just fallen into the water, I am morally obligated to pull him 
out of the water, just as I am morally obligated not to push him into the water in 
the first place. The real issue is one of responsibility. Often, we are responsible for 
what we do and not for what we let happen; but as the example shows, this is not 
always so. Therefore we need a theory which explains under which conditions we 
are responsible for preventing a particular outcome. While the distinction between 
actions and omissions might be relevant within that theory, it cannot in itself do all 
the moral work.  
Another approach is to draw a distinction between two points of view: an 
objective and a subjective one. In his book The Rejection of Consequentialism, Samuel 
Scheffler defends an agent-centred prerogative: 
 
It might be suggested that [...] consequentialism ignores the independence of 
the personal point of view. This suggestion might be developed in the 
following way. Each person has a point of view, a perspective from which 
projects are undertaken, plans are developed, events are observed, and life is 
lived. Each point of view constitutes, among other things, a locus relative to 
which harms and benefits can be assessed, and are typically assessed by the 
person who has the point of view. This assessment is both different from and 
compatible with the assessment of overall states of affairs from an impersonal 
standpoint.34 
 
Scheffler’s idea has some plausibility in the world of personal ethics because it 
limits the seemingly endless demands that consequentialism imposes upon every 
person. But his approach cannot be applied to the state. The state, as an 
abstraction, does not have a personal point of view. The people acting in the name 
of the state (for example the minister of defence who wonders whether he ought 
to order the shooting down of a plane) do of course have such a personal point of 
view, but when acting in their capacities as representatives of the state we demand 
of them to take an objective as opposed to personal perspective. We think that if it 
were objectively the right thing to shoot down the plane or to kill one innocent 
person to prevent five from being killed, then the government official in charge 
must leave worries about his personal viewpoint aside and do what is objectively 
right. If he is not prepared to do this, then he is the wrong person for the tough 
job of governing a country. A further reason why the idea of an agent-centred 
prerogative is unhelpful is that it does not capture the real concern of those 
opposed to state-conducted killings, who want to argue that such killings are 
impermissible, whereas Scheffler’s argument just defends a prerogative not to kill.  
 
 
                                                     
34 S. Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: OUP, 1982) 20. 
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V. 
 
What about victim-focussed approaches? Can it plausibly be argued that there is 
something about the victim which makes it impermissible to kill him, even if by 
doing so one could prevent five other killings from happening? Frances Kamm 
has made an important contribution to this debate. For her, one must distinguish 
between the person’s actually being killed on the one hand, and the person’s status 
as inviolable on the other hand. She admits that when it is permissible to kill one 
person to prevent five killings, one might save lives. However, even if lives are 
saved, something else suffers: the general status of persons as inviolable.  
 
The realm of status is not what happens to people. If many are killed in 
violation of their rights because we may not kill one to save them, their status 
as individuals who should not be killed does not change. If it were permitted 
to kill the one to save them, their status would change. We may be concerned 
about what happens, but be unwilling to prevent it in a way that is only 
consistent with a change in status. It is a mistake to see an opposition 
between the rights of the one person and the rights of all others, since the 
status of everyone is affected by the way it is permissible to treat one 
person.35 
 
Kamm is interested not in what is done (one killing rather than five), but what is 
allowed to be done. For her, if it were permissible to kill one to prevent five killings, 
this would imply that persons are violable. This would mean that they had a lower 
status compared to a situation where it was not permissible to kill one to prevent 
five killings. Therefore, she concludes, if we want to protect people’s status as 
inviolable, we must accept that we must not kill one to prevent five killings. This 
obviously involves a sacrifice: sometimes we must let people die where we could 
save a greater number of lives. What is it about the status that justifies this 
sacrifice?  
 
If we are inviolable in this way, we are more important creatures than more 
violable ones; this higher status is in itself a benefit to us [...] It is having the 
status itself which is a benefit, not just its being respected [...] Having the 
status is a benefit, in part, because it makes one worthy of respect, owed 
respect [...] Furthermore, the world is, in a sense, a better place for having 
more important creatures in it. Our having higher status is a benefit to the 
world.36 
 
                                                     
35 F.M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality, vol. 2 (Oxford: OUP, 1996) 272 (emphasis in the original). 
36 ibid, 272 (emphasis in the original). 
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Two points have to be noted to clarify the theory and avoid misunderstandings. 
First, inviolability is not an all-or-nothing concept: one can be more or less 
inviolable. Kamm discusses the example that it is permissible to kill one to prevent 
ten killings.37 Compared to a case where it is only permissible to kill one to prevent 
one million killings, the inviolability of the person is low in this case. However, 
compared to a situation where it is permissible to kill one to prevent two killings, it 
is high. Second, it is important to see that Kamm’s point is not that her status 
argument applies to all instances of killings. For example, it surely does not apply 
to a killing carried out in self-defence: nobody would claim that in order to 
preserve the status of humans as inviolable, one must tolerate being killed by an 
aggressor rather than kill the aggressor in self-defence. Similarly, it is not obvious 
whether Kamm’s argument applies to the Aviation Security Act case (more on this 
below). So her argument is not that the permissibility of each and every killing 
affects the status of humans as violable; rather it is an argument justifying the 
general, deontological claim that sometimes an action may be impermissible even 
though it would lead to better outcomes. But the argument as to when this is the 
case still needs to be made independently: ‘Simple talk about inviolability is not 
enough. Restrictions and constraints are better explained by inviolability against 
impositions that create inappropriate relations between victim and beneficiaries.’38 
So the question is under what circumstances would killing one to prevent five 
from being killed lead to an inappropriate relationship between persons? There 
exists a vivid, controversial, and ongoing debate about these questions in moral 
theory, which cannot be done justice here. Much of this debate focuses on some 
of the countless variations of the so-called Trolley Problem:39 suppose a trolley is 
heading towards a group of five people. It is going to kill them unless it is 
redirected to a second track where it will kill one person instead. Is it morally 
permissible or required to redirect the trolley? Compare this case to the Fat Man 
Case: again, a trolley is heading towards the five, but this time the only way to stop 
it is to take a fat man and throw him onto the tracks. The trolley will crash into the 
man and come to a halt; the fat man will die, but the five will remain uninjured. In 
both cases one has the possibility of killing one in order to prevent five from being 
killed; yet most people would be prepared to redirect the trolley in the first case 
but not to throw the fat man onto the tracks in the second case. The trolley cases 
come in countless modifications whose purpose it is to show the appeal or non-
appeal of the various principles which have been suggested to find satisfactory 
solutions to the question of when it is permissible to kill some in order to save 
many from being killed.  
Mattias Kumm has recently subscribed to one of these approaches as 
particularly helpful for the discussion of whether there are absolute rights in 
                                                     
37 ibid, 275. 
38 ibid, 274.  
39 ibid, ch. 6; J. Thomson, ‘The Trolley Problem’ (1985) 94 Yale L J 1395; Walen, n 33 above. 
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human rights law.40 He refers to an approach first presented by Alec Walen, who 
draws a distinction between enablers and disablers.41 This distinction can be 
explained with regard to the two trolley cases introduced above. In the first 
scenario, it would doubtless be permissible (or required) to redirect the trolley if 
there was no person on the other track. The claim of the one person on that track 
is therefore that his being on the track should disable the otherwise permissible 
rescue action. Compare this to the Fat Man Case: here the fat man is instrumental 
to the success of the rescue action. He is being used as a means to stop the trolley 
and thus enable the rescue action. Kumm argues that as a matter of human rights 
law, proportionality analysis applies to the case of disablers being killed, but that 
there is a deontological constraint against killing an enabler.42 Applying this logic 
to the case of the Aviation Security Act he concludes that the German FCC got it 
wrong: the Court argued that the innocent people aboard the plane are being used 
as a means. However, in reality their claims are only those of disablers: there is no 
doubt, indeed the FCC itself expressly states, that the shooting down would be 
justified if there were no innocent passengers on board. Therefore the claim of the 
passengers is that their presence on the plane should make the otherwise 
permissible shooting down impermissible. The passengers are, contrary to the 
argument of the German FCC, not being used as objects or means. They are not 
being used at all because their presence makes no difference to the rescue action, 
and their death is only a regrettable side effect.43  
On this point, the Aviation Security Act case is quite a spectacular failure. 
Note that this failure does not affect the outcome of the case because, as 
explained above, the relevant part of the Aviation Security Act was also declared 
unconstitutional for other reasons. However, imagine a scenario in which a 
misguided interpretation of the Kantian formula controls the outcome: not only 
would the Court protect a right which does not exist, it would also put national 
security at risk in a way which not only the legislature could not fix by amending 
the statute, but worse, which could not even be fixed by amending the 
constitution: under German constitutional law, the guarantee of human dignity in 
Article 1(1) BL is unamendable according to the so-called ‘eternity clause’ of 
Article 79(3), which states that ‘[a]mendments to this Basic Law affecting [...] the 
principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible’. 
I agree with much of Kumm’s methodology; in particular he deserves credit 
for taking the discussion about absolute rights in human rights law in a very 
promising direction by linking it to current debates in moral theory. However, I 
also think that the matter, especially with regard to the Aviation Security Act case, 
                                                     
40 M. Kumm, ‘Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights: On the Place and Limits of the 
Proportionality Requirement’ in Paulson and Pavlakos (eds), Law, Rights, Discourse: Themes of the Work of 
Robert Alexy (Oxford: Hart, 2007) 131, 153-164. 
41 Walen, n 33 above. 
42 Kumm, n 40 above, 154. 
43 ibid, 155-156. 
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might be even more complex. While it seems to be uncontroversial that it is 
indeed impermissible to kill enablers, it is not clear that it is always permissible to 
resort to consequentialist balancing in the case of disablers. In the Car Case, a 
person is rushing to the hospital to save five, foreseeing that he will run over and 
kill one person on the road.44 The one person on the road is a disabler: his claim 
would have to be that his presence on the street makes the otherwise permissible 
rescue action impermissible. Yet it seems impermissible to kill him.45 Another case 
introduced by Kamm is the Grenade Case: a runaway trolley will kill five people 
unless we explode a grenade that will kill an innocent bystander as a side effect.46 
Again, the bystander would be a disabler; yet Kamm argues it would be 
impermissible to explode the grenade.  
There is a remarkable parallel between the Grenade case and the Aviation 
Security Act case. One difference between them is that in the Aviation Security 
Act case, the passengers are part of the weapon. I wonder whether the real reason 
for the permissibility of balancing in the Aviation Security Act case is not that the 
innocent passengers are disablers, but rather that they are part of the weapon. 
Kamm stresses that for the doctrine of double effect, which is closely related to 
the distinction between enablers and disablers, to have any plausibility, one must 
allow ‘for the permissibility of intending harm to the guilty and in self- or other-
defense against even moral innocents who are threats’.47 I cannot resolve the issue 
here; nor am I sure that the debates in moral theory would provide us with a 
resolution to this moral puzzle (mainly because real life scenarios as the one 
envisaged by the Aviation Security Act tend to be more complex than those 
discussed in moral philosophy); rather, I just want to point out the complexity of 
the issue. Intuitively I do agree with Kumm’s conclusion that there is no 
deontological constraint against shooting down the plane; but I tend to think that 
the reason for this lies not in the role of the passengers as disablers but rather in 
the fact that the passengers are part of the weapon.  
There are more unresolved problems with the prohibition to use people as 
enablers in situations outside killing. Very often the state uses people as means in 
unobjectionable ways. Kumm is aware of this and acknowledges that there is 
nothing wrong with requiring a passer-by to suffer minor inconveniences to aid 
another person in serious distress.48 He argues that using people as a means is not 
always absolutely prohibited but that ‘the distinction between enablers and 
                                                     
44 The example was first used by Philippa Foot; see her Moral Dilemmas (Oxford: OUP, 2002) 81. The 
formulation used here derives from F. Kamm, Intricate Ethics (Oxford: OUP, 2007) 22.  
45 Walen, n 33 above, 203, discusses this case and modifies his understanding of disablers to the effect 
that while the one ‘seems to be a disabler since you could save the five perfectly well if he were not in 
your way’ (204), ‘you are only free to respond to the needs of some if you have a right to use the 
necessary means’ (205), and ‘the means of saving the five includes getting to them, and that aspect of the 
means is what would kill the one’ (207). While this reasoning may be correct in explaining the correct 
outcome of the case, I wonder if it in substance abolishes the distinction between enablers and disablers 
and introduces a new, more complex principle, evaluating which is beyond the scope of this essay.  
46 Kamm, n 35 above, 151.  
47 ibid, 150.  
48 Kumm, n 40 above, 163. 
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disablers completely changes the baseline to be used to assess rights 
infringements’. Take the case of a terrorist plausibly threatening to blow up a city 
unless a specific innocent and nonthreatening person is tortured or killed. 
Torturing or killing this person would mean to use him as an enabler, and this is 
prohibited. Similarly, in the widely discussed transplant case,49 killing one healthy 
person in order to use his organs to save five other persons would be 
impermissible. By way of contrast, requiring a passer-by to make a phone call to 
request an ambulance in order to save a person who has just suffered a heart 
attack seems permissible in spite of the fact that this also uses the passer-by as a 
means. So in this light we might say, with Kumm, that the distinction between 
enablers and disablers changes the baseline, rather than completely outruling the 
use of enablers. But it often seems to be the case that we use people in ways which 
are much more intrusive than requiring them to make phone calls. In countries 
with compulsory military service, every citizen must for a certain time forgo his 
freedom of profession in order to serve in the army and risk his life, and this is 
often justified by reference to certain assumed gains compared to the alternative 
policy of a professional army. But those gains are at best relatively modest and are 
hard to justify even in light of the proportionality principle; they would certainly 
be entirely impermissible under the ‘changed baseline’ approach. Similar problems 
arise with regard to taxation which uses the taxpayers as means, or enablers, to 
otherwise legitimate state goals.50 My point is not that Kumm’s approach is wrong, 
but I want to point to one aspect in which generalising it leads to other puzzles, 
which might or might not be resolvable.  
Here is a further puzzle. Kumm applies his approach to torture cases.51 The 
most widely discussed case in this context is the imaginary ‘ticking bomb case’: the 
police have caught a terrorist who has hidden a bomb in the centre of a city, and 
the only way to prevent the bomb from going off and killing many people is to 
torture the terrorist in order to make him reveal the whereabouts of the bomb. 
Kumm explains, to my mind convincingly, that our focus, at least initially, should 
not be on the numbers of people we could save by torturing the terrorist.52 Rather, 
it should be on the special relationship between the terrorist and the victims, and 
this relationship is independent of whether there are one or one million victims. 
So it might be helpful to focus on a case with only one victim, and as it happens, 
there is a real and, again, German case at hand. In the notorious Jakob von 
Metzler case, the police had threatened a suspect accused of kidnapping a young 
boy with torture (and was prepared to carry out that threat) should he not reveal 
the whereabouts of his victim who was erroneously believed to be still alive. 
Under the threat, the suspect confessed.  
                                                     
49 Kamm, n 35 above, 143; Walen, n 33 above, 187-188. 
50 This brings us back to Nozick’s concerns about the welfare state and his theory of rights, discussed 
above.  
51 Kumm, n 40 above, 158-164. 
52 ibid, 160.  
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As a preliminary point, Kumm is aware of the fact that there might be good 
policy reasons for prohibiting torture in all cases, such as reasons relating to the 
extreme suffering of the victim, slippery slope arguments, and practical or 
symbolic concerns.53 His question is therefore whether there is a deontological 
constraint against torture in this case, and this he denies: while it is true that the 
kidnapper is used as a means – one of the terrible things that torture does is that it 
coerces people to commit self-betrayal in order to serve the purposes of the 
torturer – the deontological constraint is, according to Kumm, neutralised because 
of the personal responsibility of the kidnapper for the threat.54  
I believe that this is partly but maybe not entirely correct. Let us modify the 
example. Suppose that the kidnapper is not captured by the police but by the 
father of the boy. There is no time left to call the police, and the only way for the 
father to save his son is to torture the kidnapper in order to make him reveal the 
whereabouts of his son. I think that most would agree (although I acknowledge 
this would require further argument) that it is permissible for the father to torture 
the kidnapper. So for this scenario I believe that Kumm is correct to say that 
because of the personal responsibility of the kidnapper for the boy there is no 
deontological constraint against torturing the kidnapper. But I am not sure about 
what is right when the kidnapper is in the custody of the police. There may be a 
difference between what is permissible to do to a person in the name of the state, 
and what is permissible to do as a private person, and I do not think that this 
difference is explainable only in terms of institutional or policy considerations 
such as slippery slope arguments. Rather, my intuition is that there is an additional 
constraint at work here which leads to everyone’s, including the kidnapper’s, status 
as inviolable requiring that torture be impermissible if carried out (or authorised) 
by the state. Put differently: I tend to think that if it were permissible to torture the 
kidnapper in the name of the state in the Jakob von Metzler case, this would affect 
everyone’s (and not only kidnappers’) inviolability: human beings would become 
beings whom the state may sometimes permissibly torture; and my intuition is that 
this is too high a price to pay for the protection of lives, except maybe in 
catastrophic scenarios (eg a nuclear bomb in London). Again, this does not even 
come close to a watertight argument because one could reply that the 
permissibility to torture the kidnapper affects only the status of kidnappers and 
comparable aggressors, as opposed to the status of everyone. I repeat that I do not 
claim to resolve the issue here but only point out some of the puzzles in the area 
of deontological constraints. It appears to be a possibility that deontological 
constraints apply in different ways to private persons and the state.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
53 ibid, 159. 
54 ibid, 161.  
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VI. 
 
In spite of the many open questions, I think that Kumm’s and Walen’s distinction 
between enablers and disablers points to one important conclusion: the status of 
innocent and non-threatening persons as inviolable requires that they not be killed 
when killing them would involve using them as a means (as enablers). This does 
not necessarily amount to an absolute right because, as I pointed out above, 
inviolability is not an all-or-nothing concept; persons can be more or less 
inviolable. But what can be concluded is that while maybe not absolute, the right 
to life certainly offers to enablers more than simply proportional protection: 
enablers cannot justifiably be killed on the ground that this leads to a reduction in 
the overall number of people getting killed. It is therefore correct to say that the 
right to life is sometimes absolute or near-absolute. 
For the reasons given above I am not convinced that consequentalist 
balancing is always permissible in the case of disablers. I do however think that 
there are at least some scenarios where it is permissible to kill innocent disablers, 
such as in the one envisaged by the Aviation Security Act case. This conclusion 
will leave many opponents of state-conducted killings unsatisfied because they 
want to stop the state from engaging in the business of killing innocent, non-
threatening persons altogether. I cannot think at the moment of any realistic case 
where the state would seriously consider killing enablers (one would have to think 
of examples such as terrorists threatening to commit a devastating attack unless 
one innocent person is killed). The fact that such cases are not realistic in the sense 
that no state would comply with such requests shows that deontological 
constraints have a firm place in our moral and legal reasoning, including our 
reasoning about what human rights require. But they cannot be extended to cover 
all cases of killing innocents. 
